Enforcement is a critical component of deterrence. Prosecutorial records provide a highly visible and easily quantifiable metric. Viewed in isolation however, enforcement proclivity can skew policy direction, budgetary priorities, operational capacity and overarching capacity. If, for example, the offences prosecuted are trivial or apply only to those operating at the lower end of the market, the un-weighted data can become misleading. Stark variance in regulatory styles between the United Kingdom and United States, for example, demonstrate the critical importance of cultural differences, legal frameworks, mandate and political environment. At a more fundamental level, differing enforcement approaches point to competing interpretations of what constitutes risk. Is it the regulators duty to guarantee the development of the market or police its internal operation? If the latter, to what extent should the regulator intervene in the internal corporate governance of major corporations in order to ensure more effective risk management? On what basis could or should a more interventionist approach be legitimated? This series provides regular updates on major court cases and assesses the impact of the litigation on the dynamics of financial regulation.